This paper investigates a class of mixed stochastic linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) social optimization and Nash game in the context of a large scale system. Two types of interactive agents are involved: a major agent and a large number of weaklycoupled minor agents. All minor agents are cooperative to minimize the social cost as the sum of their individual costs, whereas such social cost are conflictive to that of major agent. Thus, major agent and all minor agents are further competitive to reach some non-zero Nash equilibrium. The control processes enter both diffusion and drift terms of all major and minors' states. This extends the standard setup in which control only enters the drift terms, and such extension brings more modeling difference and technical difficulties, in particular, when dealing with the feedback decentralized strategy via Riccati equation and meanfield consistency condition (CC) representation. Applying the mean-field approximations and person-by-person optimality, we obtain auxiliary control problems for major agent and minor agents, respectively. The decentralized social strategy is derived by a class of new CC system, which is mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential equations. The well-posedness of the CC system is obtained by the discounting method. The related asymptotic social optimality for minor agents, and Nash equilibrium for major-minor agents are also verified.
Introduction
Mean-field games for large-population system have been extensively studied recently. The most significant feature of a large-population system is the existence of considerable insignificant agents whose dynamics and cost functionals are interrelated via the state-average. Although the effect of an individual agent on the overall population scale is negligible, the effects of their statistical behaviors cannot be ignored at the population scale. The central goal of the individual agents is to obtain decentralized strategies based on limited information of the individual agent since it is unrealistic for a given agent to obtain all other agents' information when the number of agents is sufficiently high. One efficient approach is the mean-field games method which enables us to obtain the decentralized strategies through the limiting auxiliary control problem and the related consistency condition (CC) system. Along this direction, the interested readers are referred to [12] and [15] for the derivation of mean-field games, [3] , [8] , [10] for linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) mean-field games, [5] for probabilistic analysis in mean-field games, [17] for risk-sensitive meanfield games, [16] for discrete-time mean-field games. In the basic mean-field decision model, all agents have comparably small influence. However, in some real models there exist an agent that has a significant influence on other agents. Thus a modified framework is to introduce a major agent interacting with a large number of minor agents. [11] considered LQG games with a major player and a large number of minor players. [18] studies large population dynamic games involving nonlinear stochastic dynamical systems with a major agent and N minor agents. [4] studied two-person zero-sum stochastic differential games, in which one player is a major one and the other player is a group of N minor agents which are collectively playing, statistically identical, and have the same cost functional. [9] considered LQG mean-field games with a major agent and considerable heterogeneous minor agents where the individual admissible controls are constrained in closed convex subsets.
The agents in all aforementioned works are competitive, i.e., all agents have their individual costs thus they are non-cooperative to aim some (asymptotic) Nash nonzero equilibrium. On the other hand, dynamic cooperative multi-agent decision problems have also been well studied in literature due to their theoretical analysis interests and real application potentials. [13] studied a class of LQG control problems with N decision-makers, where the basic objective is to minimize a social cost as the sum of N individual costs containing mean-field coupling.
[24] investigated social optima of mean-field LQG control models with Markov jump parameters. [2] considered LQG mean-field team-optimal problem by assuming mean-field sharing for a given population size N , which gives an optimal control problem with special partial state information. [14] studied an LQG mean-field control problem involving a major player and a large number of minor players, where the objective is to optimize a social cost as a weighted sum of the individual costs under decentralized information. For other research and applications of cooperative mean-field control problems, interested readers are referred to [1] , [6] , [7] , [19] , [21] , [23] , [25] and the references therein.
In this paper, we will investigate a new class of stochastic LQG optimization problems involving a major agent and a large number of weakly-coupled minor agents. Specifically, the minor agents are cooperative to minimize the social cost as the sum of individual cost, while the major agent and minor agents are competitive aiming for Nash equilibrium in nonzero-sum game manner. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time to study such kind of problem. In the mean-field game, the major agent and all the minor agents are competitive so as to achieve to a Nash equilibrium; while in social optimal problems, all the agents are cooperative to find the social optimal strategies. Besides the new framework, our study also has other new features. For instance, in the state equations of the major agent and minor agents, the control process enters the drift and diffusion coefficients both.
In our study, the problem can be solved in the following way. Firstly, for the major agent, we freeze the state average as a deterministic term. Thus, the major auxiliary control problem can be obtained. By the result in [26], the major auxiliary LQG optimal control can be derived, which depends on the frozen mean-field term. Secondly, for the minor agents, under the person-by-person optimality principle, by applying variational techniques and introducing some mean-field terms, the original minor social optimization problem can also be converted to an auxiliary LQG control problem which can be solved using some traditional scheme in [26] as well. Thirdly, to determine the frozen mean-field terms, we construct the CC system by some fixed-point analysis. The mean filed terms can be obtained by solving the CC system, while the solvability of the CC system can be determined through the discounting method. Last, by using some asymptotic analysis and standard estimation of stochastic differential equations (SDEs), we show that the meanfield strategies really brings us a "good" approximation (i.e., the optimal loss tend to 0 when the population N tends to infinity).
Moreover, the innovative aspects of the obtained results in this paper are as follows: Firstly, the state process and state average enter the diffusion terms. This brings many difficulties when we apply the variational method to obtain the minor auxiliary control problem. In particular, N + 1 additional adjoint processes should be introduced to deal with the cross-terms in the cost functional variation. Secondly, since the additional backward adjoint processes are introduced, the convergence of the average of backward stochastic differential equations (BS-DEs) should be studied when we estimate the optimal loss of the mean-field games strategies. Thirdly, the control process enters the diffusion terms. Because of this, the adapted term will enter the drift term of the CC system. This also brings difficulties when we study the solvability of the CC system. We cannot obtain a forwardbackward ordinary differential equations (FBODEs) system by taking expectation on the CC system directly as usual. What we obtain is a mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) system and the limiting state average is represented in an embedding way. To its well-posedness, we deal with it by some discounting method.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we give the formulation of the mixed LQG social optima problem. In Section 3 and Section 4, we use the mean-field approximation and person-by-person optimality to find the auxiliary control problem of the major agent and minor agents, respectively. The CC system is derived in Section 5. Meanwhile, the well-posedness of CC system is also established. In Section 6, we obtain the asymptotic optimality of the decentralized strategies.
Problem formulation
Consider a finite time horizon [0, T ] for fixed T > 0. Assume that (Ω, F , {F t } 0≤t≤T , P) is a complete filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions and {W i (t), 0 ≤ i ≤ N } 0≤t≤T is an (N + 1)-dimensional Brownian motion on this space. Let F t be the filtration generated by {W i (s), 0 ≤ i ≤ N } 0≤s≤t and augmented by N P (the class of all P-null sets of F ). Let F W0 t , F Wi t and F i t be the augmentation of σ{W 0 (s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, σ{W i (s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t} and σ{W 0 (s), W i (s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t} by N P respectively.
Let ·, · denotes standard Euclidean inner product and · denotes the norm. x ⊤ denotes the transpose of a vector (or matrix) x. M ∈ S n denotes the set of symmetric n × n matrices with real elements. M > (≥)0 denotes that M ∈ S n which is positive (semi)definite, while M ≫ 0 denotes that, for some ε > 0, M − εI ≥ 0. We introduce the following spaces for any given Euclidean space H. They will be used in the paper:
We consider a weakly coupled large population system with a major agent A 0 and N individual minor agents denoted by {A i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N }. The dynamics of the N + 1 agents are given by a system of linear stochastic differential equations with mean-field coupling:
and for 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
is the average state of the minor agents.
Remark 1 We remark that the control process and state-average enter both the drift and diffusion terms. This makes our paper different to standard mean-field game (e.g., [23]) or social optimization (e.g., [13] ) literature in which only drift terms are control-dependent.
Let u(·) := (u 0 (·), u 1 (·), · · · , u N (·)) be the set of strategies of all N + 1 agents, u −0 (·) := (u 1 (·), · · · , u N (·)) and u −i (·) := (u 0 (·), · · · , u i−1 (·), u i+1 (·), · · · , u N (·)), 0 ≤ i ≤ N . The centralized admissible strategy set is given by
We impose the following assumptions on the coefficients:
(H1) A 0 (·), F 0 (·), C 0 (·), F 0 (·), A(·), F (·), C(·), F (·),
Remark 3 Under (H1), the system (1) and (2) admits a unique strong solution (x 0 , · · · , x N ) ∈ L 2 Ft (Ω; C(0, T ; R n )) × · · · × L 2 Ft (Ω; C(0, T ; R n )) for any given admissible control (u 0 , · · · , u N ) ∈ U c × · · · × U c . Under (H2), the cost functionals (3) and (4) are well defined. Note that while the coefficients are dependent on the time variable t, in what follows the variable t will usually be suppressed if no confusion would occur. We propose the following social optimization problem:
3 Auxiliary optimal control problem of the major agent Replacing x (N ) (·) of (1) and (3) byx(·) which will be determined in Section V, the limiting major agent's state is given by
and correspondingly the limiting cost functional is
We define the following auxiliary stochastic optimal control problem for major agent:
This is a standard linear quadratic stochastic control problem. For its solvability, one can introduce the following standard assumption
By [22] , we have the following result:
Proposition 6 Under (H1)-(H2) and (SA), the following Riccati equation
admits a unique strongly regular solution P 0 (·), and Problem 5 admits a unique feedback optimal controlū 0 = Θ 1z0 + Θ 2 , where
4 Stochastic optimal control problem for minor agents
Person-by-person optimality
Replace x 0 of (2) and (4) by z 0 . Let (ū 1 (·), · · · ,ū n (·)) be centralized optimal strategies of the minor agents. We now perturb u i (·) and keepū −i (·)=(ū 0 (·),ū 1 (·), · · · ,ū i−1 (·),ū i+1 (·), · · · ,ū N (·)) fixed. For j = 1, · · · , N , denote the perturbation δu j (·) = u j (·) −ū j (·),
). Therefore, the variation of the state for A i is given by
and the variation of the state for A 0 is given by
By some elementary calculations, we can further obtain the variation of the cost functional of A i as follows
For j = i, the variation of the cost functional of A j is given by
Therefore, the variation of the social cost satisfies
Now we introduce the following adjoint equations y 0 1 , y j 1 and y 2
to replace the terms x * 0 , x * j and x * * respectively. Applying Itô's formula to y j 1 , x * j , we have
and
(21) By adding (19) , (20) and (21) to (17), we have
Therefore, we introduce the decentralized auxiliary cost functional variation δJ i as follows
(23)
Decentralized strategies
Motivated by (23), one can introduce the following auxiliary problem:
The mean-field termsx, z 0 , y 2 ,ŷ 1 ,β 1 , y 0 1 , β 0 1 will be determined by the CC system in Section V. From [22] , we have the following result:
Proposition 8 Under (H1)-(H2) and (SA), the following Riccati equation
(25) admits a unique strongly regular solution P (·), and Problem 7 admits a unique feedback optimal controlū i = Λ 1xi + Λ 2 , where
Consistency condition
Because of the symmetric and decentralized character, we only need a generic Brownian motion (still denoted by W 1 ) which is independent of W 0 to characterize the CC system.
Proposition 9
The undetermined quantities in Problem 5, 7 can be determined by (x, z 0 , y 0 1 , β 0 1 ,ŷ 1 ,β 1 ,
is the solution of the following mean-field FBSDEs:
t ]−S dt+ηdW 0 , z 0 (0) = ξ 0 , z(0) = ξ,y 0 (T ) = 0,y 1 (T ) = 0, y 2 (T ) = 0,φ(T ) = 0,φ(T ) = 0,
the meanfield FBSDEs (28) take the following form:
where
, 
We will use discounting method to study the global solvability of FBSDE (29). To start, we first give some results for general nonlinear forward-backward system:
where the coefficients satisfy the following conditions:
(A1) There exist ρ 1 , ρ 2 ∈ R and positive constants k i , i = 1, · · · , 12 such that for all t, x,x, y,ȳ, z,z, a.s.,
Similar to [9] and [20] , we have the following result of solvability of (29). For the readers' convenience, we give the proof in the appendix. 
, there exists a constant δ 2 > 0 depending on ρ 1 , ρ 2 , k i , i = 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 such that if k i ∈ [0, δ 2 ), i = 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 12, FBSDE (30) admits a unique adapted solution (X, Y, Z) ∈
Let ρ * 1 and ρ * 2 be the largest eigenvalue of 1 2 (A 1 + A ⊤ 1 ) and 1 2 (B 2 +B ⊤ 2 ), respectively. Comparing (30) with (29), we can check that the parameters of (H3) and (H4) can be chosen as follows:
Now we introduce the following assumption:
It follows from Theorem 10 that
Proposition 11 Under (H1)-(H3), there exists a constant δ 3 > 0 depending on ρ * 1 , ρ * 2 , k i , i = 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, such that if k i ∈ [0, δ 3 ), i = 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 12, FBSDE (29) admits a unique adapted solution (X, Y, Z) ∈
Thus, via Proposition 6, 8, 11, the following result can be obtained straightforwardly and we omit its detailed proof.
Theorem 12 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), the largepopulation system (1), (2), (3) and (4) admits a unique feedback form mean-field decentralized strategy setũ(·) = (ũ 0 (·),ũ 1 (·), · · · ,ũ N (·)) whereũ 0 = Θ 1x0 + Θ 2 ,ũ i = Λ 1xi + Λ 2 , for i = 1, · · · , N .x 0 andx i are the realized states satisfying
and (Λ 1 , Λ 2 ) are given by (10) and (26) respectively. The mean-field termŝ x, z 0 , y 2 ,ŷ 1 ,β 1 , y 0 1 , β 0 1 in (10) and (26) are uniquely determined by (28).
Through the discussion above, the mean-field decentralized strategies have been characterized. In what follows, its asymptotic optimality will be studied.
Asymptotic ε-optimality
where u ε −0 := {u ε 1 , · · · , u ε N }.
Let u be the mean-field strategies given by Theorem 12 and the realized decentralized states ( x 0 , x 1 , · · · , x N ) satisfy (32) and x (N ) = 1 N N i=1 x i . Forū = (ū 0 ,ū 1 , · · · ,ū N ), the corresponding optimal states of auxiliary problem are:
where z is the solution of (28). Therefore, the optimal control of Problem 5 is
First, we need some estimations. In the proofs below, we will use K to denote a generic constant whose value may change from line to line.
Lemma 14 [9, Lemma 5.1] Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), there exists a constant K 1 independent of N such that
Lemma 15 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), there exists a constant K 2 independent of N such that
PROOF. It is easy to get that
By Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality, we have
Finally, it follows from Gronwall's inequality, and Lemma 14 that there exists a constant K 2 independent of N such that
Lemma 16 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), there exists a constant K 3 independent of N such that
PROOF. It is easy to check that
Therefore, it follows from Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality that
Therefore, it follows from Gronwall's inequality and Lemma 15 that
dt
Similar to the proof of Lemma 16, we have the following result:
Lemma 17 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), there exists a constant K 5 independent of N such that
Major agent
Lemma 18 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA),
PROOF. Recall (3) and (8), it follows from
),
Let us consider the case that the major agent A 0 uses an alternative strategy u 0 while for i = 1, · · · , N , the minor agent A i use the strategy u i . The realized states with major agent's perturbation are
The decentralized limiting states with major agent's perturbation are
Similar to Lemma 15 and 16, we have
Lemma 19 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), there exists a constant K 6 independent of N such that
Lemma 20 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), there exists a constant K 7 independent of N such that
Thus, we have the following result.
Lemma 21 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), we have
PROOF.
Theorem 22 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), (Θ 1 , Θ 2 ) is a 1 √ N -optimal strategy for the major agent.
PROOF. It follows from Lemma 18 and Lemma 21 that
. ✷ 6.2 Minor agent
Representation of social cost
Rewrite the large-population system (1) and (2) as follows: 
Similarly, the social cost takes the following form: and for i = 1, · · · , N, j = i,
Next, by the variation of constant formula, the strong solution of (33) admits the following representation:
where Correspondingly, L * is defined as the adjoint operator of L w.r.t. the inner product a, b = E T 0 b, a dt (referring [26]). Given any admissible u, we can express x as follows x(·) = (Lu(·))(·) + ΓΞ(·), x(T ) = Lu(·) + ΓΞ. Hence, we can rewrite the cost functional as follows:
Define the following operators
Qx, x + Ru, u dt = L * QLu(·), u(·) +2 L * QΓy(·), u(·) + QΓy(·), Γy(·) + Ru, u = (L * QL+R)u(·), u(·) +2 L * QΓy(·), u(·) + QΓy(·), Γy(·) := M 2 u(·), u(·) +2 M 1 , u(·) +M 0 .
(36) Note that, M 2 is a self-adjoint positive semidefinite bounded linear operator.
Minor agent's perturbation
Let us consider the case that the minor agent A i uses an alternative strategy u i while the major agent and all other minor agents A j , j = i use the strategies u −i . The realized states with the i th minor agent's perturbation are
Moreover, introduce the following system:
Similar to the computation in Section 4.1, we have
where ε 1 , · · · , ε 13 are defined by (14) , (16) , (18) and (22) . Finally, we have
At the end of this subsection, we give some lemmas which will be used in subsection 3).
Lemma 23 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), there exists a constant K 9 independent of N such that
PROOF. Note that
Thus,
Finally, it follows from Gronwall's inequality that
By Lemma 15, Lemma 17 and Lemma 23, we have
Lemma 24 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), there exist constants K 10 ,
and sup
Lemma 25 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), there exists a constant K 12 independent of N such that
PROOF. By the equations of δx 0 , δx i , δx j and Gronwall's inequality, we have
It is easy to check that
Applying Itô's formula to | N j=1 δx j | 2 , we have
Lemma 26 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), there exist constants K 13 , K 14 , K 15 independent of N such that
PROOF. First, we have the following dynamics
It then follows from Gronwall's inequality and Lemma 25 that
Similarly, we have (47) and (48). ✷
Asymptotic optimality
In order to prove asymptotic optimality for the minor agents, it suffices to consider the perturbations u −0 ∈ U −0 such that J (N )
soc ( u 0 , u −0 ). It is easy to check that J (N ) soc ( u 0 , u −0 ) ≤ KN, where K is a constant independent of N . Therefore, in what follows, we only consider the perturbations
Let δu i = u i − u i , and consider a perturbation u = u + (0, δu 1 , · · · , δu N ) := u + δu. Then by Section 6.2.1, we have
where M 2 u + M 1 , δu i is the Fréchet differential of J (N ) soc on u with variation δu i . It follows from Cauchy-Schwarz inequality that
(50) Therefore, in order to prove asymptotic optimality for the minor agents, we only need to show that
We need to introduce another assumption on the convergence of solutions of BSDEs:
(H4) There exists constants L 1 , L 2 > 0 independent of N such that
Theorem 27 Under (H1)-(H4) and (SA), (Λ 1 , Λ 2 ) of (26) is a 1 √ N -optimal strategy for the minor agents.
PROOF. From Section 6.2.2, we have
From the optimality of u, we have
Moreover, it follows from Lemma 14-26 that
Therefore,
Therefore, it follows from Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality and Gronwall's inequality that
If C = 0, applying Itô's formula to 1
, it is easy to check that (51) in (H4) holds.
Remark 29 If the state has the following form
Assumption (H4) is not needed to obtain the asymptotic optimality of the minor agents. However, if the state equations of the minor agents take the form (2), we need to suppose the assumption (H4) hold and we will continue to study this in the future work.
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A Appendix: Discounting method
For any given (Y, Z)∈L 2 F (0, T ; R m )×L 2 F (0, T ; R m×(d+1) ) and 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the following SDE has a unique solution: (A.1) Therefore, we can introduce a map M 1 : (Y, Z) ∈ L 2 F (0, T ; R m )×L 2 F (0, T ; R m×(d+1) ) → X ∈ L 2 F (0, T ; R n ) by (A.1). Moreover, we have the following result:
Lemma 30 Let X i be the solution of (A.1) corresponding to (Y i , Z i ), i = 1, 2 respectively. Then for all ρ ∈ R and some constant l 1 > 0, we have (A.7) Thus, we can introduce another map M 2 : X ∈ L 2 F (0,T ;R n ) → (Y, Z) ∈ L 2 F (0, T ; R m )×L 2 F (0,T ; R m×(d+1) ) by (A.7). Similarly, we have the following result:
Lemma 31 Let (Y i , Z i ) be the solution of (A.7) corresponding to X i , i = 1, 2, respectively. Then for all ρ ∈ R and some constants l 3 , l 4 , l 5 , l 6 > 0 such that 
